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Abstract 
Though mainstream sociological theory has been founded within dualisms such as 
structure/agency, nature/culture, and mind/matter, a thread within sociology dating back to 
Spencer and Tarde (Karakayali, 2015) favoured a monist ontology that cut across such 
dualistic categories.  This thread has been reinvigorated by recent developments in social 
theory, including the new materialisms, posthumanism and affect theories.  Here we assess 
ZKDWDPRQLVWRUµIODW¶RQWRORJ\PHDQVIRUVRFLRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRINHy concepts such 
as structures and systems, power and resistance.  We examine two monistic sociologies: 
%UXQR/DWRXU¶VµVRFLRORJ\RIDVVRFLDWLRQV¶DQG'H/DQGD¶VRQWRORJ\RIDVVHPEODJHV
Understandings of social processes in terms of structures, systems or mechanisms are 
replaced with a focus upon the micropolitics of events and interactions.  Power is a flux of 
IRUFHVRUµDIIHFWV¶IXOO\LPPDQHQWZLWKLQHYHQWVZKLOHUHVLVWDQFHLVVLPLODUO\DQDIIHFWLYH
flow in events producing micropolitical effects contrary to power or control.  
 
Introduction 
Sociology has been frequently enthusiastic to expose the binary oppositions RUµGXDOLVPV¶that 
invest much human thinking: systems of thought that have been used culturally to 
differentiate and divide human from animal (Peggs, 2012: 2), man from woman (Braidotti, 
2011: 39), noble IURPFRPPRQHUµPRGHUQ¶IURPµWUDGLWLRQDO¶FXOWXUHV%KDPEUD
Spivak, 1988), straight from queer (Weeks, 2012), saint from sinner (Durkheim, 2005), 
normal from pathological (Foucault, 1981: 44), purity from pollution (Douglas, 1984).  
Dualisms work by privileging one pole of a binary opposition at the expense of another 
(Derrida, 1976), and serve typically to assert power and privilege of one class, gender, 
sexuality, race and so on over others.  In so doing, they establish the premises and cognitive 
armoury for patriarchy, colonialism, homophobia and class or caste systems, the scapegoating 
RIµIRUHLJQHUV¶and the anthropocentrism that underpins activities from industrialised farming 
to global environmental policy (Fox and Alldred, 2017).   
 
While sociological analysis has exposed the dualist schemata used in daily life, it has not 
been immune itself to the seductions of binary oppositions.  Sociological dualism was 
manifest in 0DU[¶VGichotomy RIODERXUFDSLWDODQG'XUNKHLP¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ
traditional and modern societies, but most pervasively in the dualism of agency/structure and 
a nature/culture divide that has arguably underpinned the disciplinary development and 
professional closure of sociology itself (Benton, 1991; Meloni, 2016).  Many of these 
sociological binaries have been the subject of fierce debate within the discipline (Karakayali, 
2015).  The social sciences have occasionally been strongly criticised for sustaining 
FRQWHPSRUDU\GXDOLVPVIRUH[DPSOHDQWKURSRORJ\¶VHDUO\FROOXVLRQZLWKUDFLVWDQG
colonialist theories (Gravlee and Sweet, 2008: 28) or second-wave feminist essentialism 
(Braidotti, 2011: 129; New, 1998: 349).  We shall not attempt however to document the long 
history of dissent, commentary and criticism around the sociological dualisms of 
agency/structure (Gleeson and Knights, 2006; Knights and Willmott, 1983; Mouzelis, 2014; 
Piiroinen 2014) or around the distinctions between nature/culture, human/non-human, 
animate/inanimate (Benton, 1991; Stevens, 2012; Walker, 2005).  Figure 1 summarises some 
of the most common binary oppositions to be found within sociological discourses.   
 
(insert Fig 1 about here) 
 
6RFLRORJ\¶Vself-positioning in relation to these binaries made it the target for post-
structuralist theorists, who ruthlessly deconstructed the oppositions.  By privileging culture 
over nature (for example, by emphasising gender ± a cultural formation ± at the expense of 
biological sex) sociology established the credentials of the social world, which is of course, 
WKHGLVFLSOLQH¶VFKRVHQVXEMHFW-matter (Game, 1991: 33, Meloni, 2016).  The opposing 
elements of the agency/structure binary ± endlessly re-worked in structuralist, interactionist, 
historical materialist, structuration and realist theories (DeLanda, 2006: 9-10) ± has been 
criticised for generating two contrary tendencies within sociology.  On one hand, structuralist 
sociologies¶ concern with the determining features of social norms, roles, rituals and systems 
IRULQVWDQFH0DU[¶VIRFXVXSRQDQHFRQRPLFµEDVH¶VWUXFWXULQJVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQVRUFULWLFDO
UHDOLVP¶VFRPPLWPHQWVWRXQFRYHULQJXQGHUO\LQJµPHFKDQLVPV¶over-emphasise social 
continuities and stability (Wrong, 1961) at the expense of flux and possibility.  On the other, 
an emphasis upon human agency has led to an µXQGHUVRFLDOLVHG¶VRFLRORJ\WKDWprivileged 
reason and reflexivity, desires and emotions, while downplaying the social and material 
contexts of events/interactions (Shilling, 1997). 
This critique of sociological dualism poses the interesting question of what sociology might 
look like were it to eschew entirely such binary oppositions.  The need to address this 
question arises as a consequence of the recent engagements between the social sciences and 
new materialist perspectives such as actor-network theory, non-representational theory, 
feminist posthumanism, assemblage theories and Spinozist theories of affect (Braidotti, 2013; 
Coole and Frost, 2010; Fox and Alldred, 2017).1  These, it has been argued, cut across or are 
µWUDQVYHUVDOWR¶PDQ\RIWKHbinaries in Figure 1, including mind/matter, nature/culture, 
structure/agency, micro/macro and surface/depth (Fox and Alldred, 2017; Karakayali, 2015; 
van der Tuin and Dolphijn, 2010: 153).   
 
The choreography of the paper is at follows.  We begin by exploring how social theory has 
EHHQµIODWWHQHG¶.DUDND\DOLLQWKHmonist and materialist sociological manifestos 
of Bruno Latour (2005) and Manuel DeLanda (2006).  We then apply this flattened ontology 
to re-WKLQNWKHNH\VRFLRORJLFDOFRQFHSWRIµVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH¶ZKLFKDORQJZLWKLWVELQDU\
opposite µDJHQF\¶LVHIIHFWLYHO\GLVVROYHGE\WKLVWUDQVYHUVDOPove.  Finally we assess the 
consequences for understanding power and resistance, terms that in conventional sociology 
have been frequently predicated upon an agency/structure duality.   
 
Monism, materialism and sociology 
Within contemporary sociology, monist ontologies are demonstrated floridly within the 
SRVWKXPDQDQGµnew¶PDWHULDOLVPVthat have emerged within the social sciences and 
humanities.  Whereas historical materialism focused on the development of social institutions 
and practices within a broad economic and political context of material production and 
consumption (Edwards, 2010: 282), the materiality addressed by these new materialisms is 
SOXUDORSHQFRPSOH[XQHYHQDQGFRQWLQJHQWDQGVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGµLQDUHODWLRQDO
emerJHQWVHQVH¶Coole and Frost, 2010: 29) that draws together natural and social worlds 
(ibid: 20).  These positions (to which for conciseness, we henceforth refer DVµPDWHULDOLVW¶
have in common a commitment to immanence (Deleuze, 1988: 124); in other wordVµD
philosophy of becoming in which the universe is not dependent upon DKLJKHUSRZHU¶
(Connolly, 2011: 178) ± powers that might include God, fate, evolution, life-force, Gaia, 
mechanisms, systems or structures.  Instead we are to explore events and interactions within a 
µSODQHRILPPDQHQFH¶ that possesses µno supplementary dimension¶ (Deleuze, 1988: 128). 
 
The monism of these materialisms is revealed in three ontological moves.  First, they cast to 
one side a foundational boundary dispute between µVRFLDO¶DQGµQDWXUDO¶VFLHQFHV (Meloni, 
2016), questioning the very separation between nature and culture (Latour, 2005: 13).  
Instead, they link the production of the world and everything µVRFLDO¶DQGµQDWXUDO¶within it to 
a wide variety of forces, from physical interactions, to biological processes, to social 
encounters, through to thoughts, desires, feelings and memories (Braidotti, 2000: 159; 
DeLanda, 2006; 5).   
 
Second, they regard the material world and its contents not as fixed, stable entities, but as 
relational, uneven, and in constant flux (Barad, 2007, Coole and Frost, 2010: 29; Lemke, 
FRQVHTXHQWHQWLUHO\XSRQWKHPLFURSROLWLFDOIRUFHVGHULYLQJIURPPDWWHU¶VLQWHUDFWLRQV 
within events.  For Deleuze, human bodies and all other material, social and abstract entities 
have no ontological status or integrity independent of that produced through their relationship 
to other similarly contingent and ephemeral bodies, things and ideas (Deleuze, 1988: 123).  
µAssemblages¶RIUHODWLRQV develop in unpredictable ways around actions and events 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: µin a kind of chaotic network of habitual and non-habitual 
connections, always in flux, always reassembling in difIHUHQWZD\V¶3RWWV 
 
Third, the relationality of the world is operationalised via an understanding of agency that no 
longer privileges human action.  Rather, aOOPDWWHULVµDIIHFWLYH¶± it possesses a µFDSDFLW\WR
DIIHFWDQGEHDIIHFWHG¶'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL-128), whether it is human or non-
human, animate or inanimate (DeLanda, 2006: 4; Mulcahy, 2012: 10; Youdell and 
Armstrong, 2011: 145).  5HSODFLQJKXPDQDJHQF\ZLWKµDIIHFW¶serves as an ethical and 
political counter to the humanism of the social sciences, supplying the basis both for an anti-
humanist critique of the destructive capacities of humans in the anthropocene (Lovelock, 
2007: 141), but also to re-integrate KXPDQVZLWKLQµWKHHQYLURQPHQW¶Fox and Alldred, 
2016), thus underpinning a more positive posthumanism (Braidotti; 2006: 37).  The latter, 
according to Braidotti, can be a basis for an eco-philosophy that establishes a continuum 
between human and non-human matter (Braidotti, 2006: 41; 2013: 104). 
 
When applied to sociology, these aspects of FRQWHPSRUDU\PDWHULDOLVP¶V monism (van der 
7XLQDQG'ROSKLMQRUµIODWRQWRORJ\¶'H/DQGDcollapse or cut across a 
range of conventional social theory dualisms ± including agency/structure, nature/culture, 
animate/inanimate, micro/macro, reason/emotion, surface/depth, word/world and mind/matter 
(Braidotti, 2013: 4-5; Coole and Frost, 2010: 26-27; Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 23; van der 
Tuin and Dolphijn, 2010: 157).2  The elision of nature/culture and human/non-human 
dualisms has been addressed elsewhere (Fox and Alldred, 2016; Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 
2013; Haraway, 1991; Karakayali, 2015: 741-742), and we address here another critical issue 
for sociology: the dissolution by sociological monism of any conception of µsocial structure¶
and the knock-on consequences for two other key sociological concepts: power and 
resistance.  As a starting position for this endeavour, we shall explore briefly the sociological 
working out of an immanent social world sans VWUXFWXUHVV\VWHPVRUµXQGHUO\LQJ
PHFKDQLVPV¶, in the manifestos for a materialist sociology of Bruno Latour (2005) and 
Manuel DeLanda (2006). 
 
Latour¶V2005) Re-assembling the Social develops ideas from actor-network theory (ANT) 
to establish his DJHQGDIRUDµVRFLRORJ\RIDVVRFLDWLRQ¶Latour, 2005: 9).  ANT is a well-
established sociological perspective that acknowledges non-human agents (often referenced 
by the French WHUPµactants¶DVFRQWULEXWRUVWRVRFLDOSURGXFWLRQwithin transient relational 
networks (Latour, 1996: 370; Law, 1999: 4) that HQFRPSDVVERWKµVRFLDO¶DQGµQDWXUDO¶
elements (Law, 1992: 379).  Latour uses this heterogeneity of social production to offer a 
concerted cULWLTXHRIWKHVRFLRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWKHVRFLDO¶as a distinct domain of 
reality (Latour, 2005: 4).  His FRQWUDU\YLHZLVWKDWµWKHVRFLDO¶LVQRWa realm distinct from 
other materialities such as biology or physics.   
 
The task of the sociologist LVFRQVHTXHQWO\QRWWRGHVFULEHDQGH[SODLQµVRFLDOIRUFHV¶EXWWR
explain how a range of heterogeneous elements from the physical, biological, economic, 
VHPLRWLFDQGRWKHUµUHDOPV¶PD\EHDVVHPEOHGWRSURGXFHWKLVRUWKDWVRFLDODJJUHJDWLRQLELG
5-6).  These aggregations (such as a nation, a corporation, a social institution, a social 
category or an aspect of human culture) are the outcomes, not the causes of interactions.  
SRFLRORJ\VKRXOGQRWUHVWULFWLWVHOIWRVWXG\LQJVRFLDOWLHVEXWLQVWHDGµWUDYel wherever new 
KHWHURJHQHRXVDVVRFLDWLRQVDUHPDGH¶LELGLQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGKRZWKHVRFLDOLV
continually assembled from non-social associations.   
 
/DWRXULELGWDUJHWVµFULWLFDOVRFLRORJ\¶ ± which we take to mean approaches such as 
critical realism and Marxism ± WKDWKDYHVRXJKWWRH[SODLQWKHVRFLDOLQWHUPVRIµGHHS¶RU
XQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUHVRUPHFKDQLVPV/DWRXU¶VPRQLVWLFVRFLRORJ\UHMHFWVDQ\VHQVHRIVRFLDO
IRUFHVRUVWUXFWXUHVZRUNLQJµEHKLQGWKHVFHQHV¶UHSODFLQJWKHVHHQWLUHO\ZLth localised, 
short-lived interactions or associations (ibid: 65-66) that constitute what is commonly called 
µWKHVRFLDO¶Such structural µH[SODQDWLRQV¶HSLWRPLVHa sociology that proffers explanatory 
FRQFHSWVVXFKDVµSDWULDUFK\¶RUµQHROLEHUDOLVP¶FRQFHSWVthat ± in his view ± themselves 
need to be explained (ibid: 130-131).   
 
The work of Manuel DeLanda applies a Deleuzian/Spinozist toolkit (Deleuze, 1988) of 
relationality, assemblages and affects to establish his materialist sociology.  In A New 
Philosophy of Society, he argues against the µRUJDQLF¶PRGHOVRIVRFLHW\WKDWKDYHVKDSHG
VRFLRORJ\IURP3DUVRQLDQIXQFWLRQDOLVPWR*LGGHQV¶VWUXFWXUDWLRQWKHRU\'H/DQGD-
9).  These sociologies are EDVHGRQDµVXSHUILFLDODQDORJ\EHWZHHQVRFLHW\DQGWKHKXPDQ
ERG\¶LELGDQGGHSHQGXSRQµUHODWLRQVRILQWHULRULW\¶LELGPHDQLQJWKDWFRPSRQHQW
HOHPHQWVWKHµRUJDQV¶KDYHLQKHUHQWDWWULEXWHVRUSURSHUWLHVWKDWDUHPDQLIHVWHGRQO\ZKHQ
constitXWHGZLWKRWKHUVSHFLILFHOHPHQWVZLWKLQDZKROHWKHµRUJDQLVP¶6RIRUH[DPSOH
µWHDFKHUV¶DQGµVWXGHQWV¶WKHSDUWVPDQLIHVWWKHLUSDUWLFXODUSURSHUWLHVZKHQLQWHUDFWLQJ
together as elements within a school or college (the whole).   
 
Instead, DeLanda UHSODFHVWKHµRUJDQLVP¶ZLWKWKHµDVVHPEODJH¶'H/DQGD-10) to 
establish a model of collectivities whose emergent properties of collectivities derive entirely 
IURPµUHODWLRQVRIH[WHULRULW\¶LELG-11, see also Buchanan, 2000: 120).  Here, a relation 
such as a human body or a non-human object may be detached from one assemblage and 
plugged into another, within which it will have differing interactions and consequently 
exercise different capacities.  So a relation PD\EHFRPHDµOHDUQLQJ-boG\¶ZKHQLWLVSDUWRI
DQDVVHPEODJHLQZKLFKLWLQWHUDFWVZLWKµWHDFKLQJ-ERGLHV¶DQGµNQRZOHGJH¶± these relational 
FDSDFLWLHVLQWXUQHVWDEOLVKWKHDVVHPEODJH¶VFDSDELOLWLHVWRVHUYHDVµVFKRRO¶RUµFROOHJH¶%XW
detached from this assemblage and pluggeGLQHOVHZKHUHWKHIRUPHUµOHDUQLQJ-ERG\¶PD\
PDQLIHVWGLIIHUHQWFDSDFLWLHVIRULQVWDQFHDVDµZRUNHU¶RUDµORYHU¶DVLWLQWHUDFWVZLWKRWKHU
ERGLHVLQDµZRUNSODFH-DVVHPEODJH¶RUDµVH[XDOUHODWLRQVKLS-DVVHPEODJH¶UHVSHFWLYHO\ 
 
DeLanda uses this Deleuzian analysis of relations and capacities as the foundation for an 
immanent sociology that can yet analyse social production at multiple societal levels.  In 
place of DµGHHSOHYHO¶RIVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVor underlying social mechanisms that provide 
conventional sociology with its explanations of phenomena, he offers a flat (DeLanda, 2005: 
51) ontological µOD\HULQJ¶RIDVVHPEODJHVIURPPLFURWRPDFURIURPLQWHUSHUVRQDO
interactions such as a conversation (DeLanda, 2006: 53-55) to social organisation at the level 
of the state (ibid: 113-116).  Every social entity ± for instance, an industrial corporation ± 
emerges from interactions occurring at a smaller scale, such as a network of managers, 
suppliers and distributors (ibid: 75).  However, at each level, entities retain a degree of 
autonomy, enabling social investigations to be undertaken while avoiding both micro- and 
macro-reductionism (ibid: 119).  
 
/DWRXU¶VDQG'H/DQGD¶VVWDWHPHQWVJLYHDIODYRXURIKRZcontemporary materialist 
scholarship can inform and indeed re-PDNHVRFLRORJ\'H/DQGD¶VZRUNVXSSOLHVDQRQWRORJ\
RIUHODWLRQDOLW\ZKLFKUHYHUVHVWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOKLHUDUFK\LQZKLFKDQHQWLW\¶VUHODWLRQVDUH
VXERUGLQDWHWRWKHHQWLW\¶VHVVHQFH%XFKDQDQ in this ontology an assemblage is 
not to be treated as an essence in its own right (DeLanda, 2006: 4), nor does it exert force 
over its assembled relations.  Rather, what relations can do within an assemblage depends 
HQWLUHO\XSRQWKHIRUFHVRUµDIIHFWV¶that relations exert upon each other (Deleuze, 1988: 101).  
0HDQZKLOH/DWRXU¶VDGPRQLWLRQWRUHVLVWµVWUXFWXUDO¶H[SODQDWLRQVVXJJHVWVD
starting-point from which to explore empirically the interactions of natural and social 
relations in events.  We draw these two perspectives together in the following section. 
 
Social production beyond structure or system 
Latour (2005: 7) has argued that structural or systemic explanations are frequently invoked to 
make sense of perceived patterns or replications of particular social formations, often in 
relation to social divisions, inequality or social disadvantage, and to explain constraints or 
OLPLWVRQKXPDQDFWLRQRURXWULJKWRSSUHVVLRQ7KHVHVRFLRORJLFDOµH[SODQDWLRQV¶LQFOXGH
µFDSLWDOLVP¶µUDFLVP¶µSDWULDUFK\¶µQHROLEHUDOLVP¶µWKHVWDWH¶µVFLHQFH¶µUHOLJLRQ¶DQGVR
on, phenomena which ± LQ/DWRXU¶VYLHZ± are precisely the things that themselves require 
explaining (ibid.: 8).  This assessment flies in the face of much received sociological wisdom, 
in which models of social structure, social systems and social mechanisms have been applied 
conceptually, from historical materialism to systems theories to critical realism.  ,Q/DWRXU¶V
RQWRORJ\µWKHUHH[LVWVQRWKLQJEHKLQGWKRVHDFWLYLWLHVHYHQWKRXJK they might be linked in a 
way that does produce a society ± RUGRHVQ¶WSURGXFHRQH¶/DWRXU 
 
5XOLQJRXWDQ\UHFRXUVHWRRYHUDUFKLQJµVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHV¶RUµV\VWHPV¶RUXQGHUO\LQJ
µPHFKDQLVPV¶DVH[SODQDWLRQVRIFRQWLQXLW\DQGFKDQJHPHDQVWKDt the task of sociological 
inquiry is no longer to reveal the hidden social forces at work in law, science, religion, 
organisations or elsewhere.  A materialist sociology must consequently analyse forces and 
social relations, power and resistance from within the immanent, relational micropolitics of 
events, activities and interactions themselves.  Later in this paper we shall explore what this 
IODWWHQHGRQWRORJ\PHDQVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIµSRZHU¶DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶First 
we assess the flat, immanent landscape of a VRFLRORJ\EH\RQGVWUXFWXUHRUV\VWHPXVLQJµWKH
PDUNHW¶DVDQLOOXVWUDWLRQ 
 
6RFLRORJLVWVKDYHYDULRXVO\WKHRULVHGWKHFDSLWDOLVWµPDUNHW¶DVDVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH6ZHGEHUJ
1994), as embodying structural relations of governance, law and property rights (Fligstein, 
RUDVµHPEHGGHG¶ZLWKLQVWUXFWXUDOVRFLDOUHODWLRQV*UDQRYHWWHU,QDOOWKHVH
various perspectives, the market structures or systematises the social relations of actors in a 
capitalist society; the structXUDOFKDUDFWHURIµWKHPDUNHW¶KDVWKHQEHHQXVHGDVDVRFLRORJLFDO
explanation of other social processes, such as shifts in how education and health care are 
delivered in contemporary capitalist societies (Hermann, 2010; Lipman, 2011).  Our concern, 
however, is not with which of these concepts ± structure, system or mechanism ± might be 
best invoked to supply an explanation of the workings of the market.  From the materialist 
SHUVSHFWLYHHVWDEOLVKHGHDUOLHUHDFKRIWKHVHULYDOµH[SODQDWLRQV¶UHVWVXSRQDbinary model of 
VRFLHW\LQZKLFKµKXPDQDJHQF\¶LVSLWWHGDJDLQVWDGLVWLQFWUHDOPRIVRFLDOIRUPDWLRQ
VRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDVDµEDVH¶RUDµGHHSOHYHO¶DQGVRPHWLPHV± DVLQ*LGGHQV¶
27) structuration theory ± VLPSO\DVDµPHGLXP¶WKDWLQVRPHZay shapes, constrains or on 
occasions facilitates action.    
 
A non-binary re-FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIµWKHPDUNHW¶QHFHVVDULO\VWDUWVIURPDYHU\GLIIHUHQW
SODFHE\ORRNLQJQRWDWVWUXFWXUHVEXWDWµPDUNHW- HYHQWV¶LQRWKHUZRUGVFRQFUHWH
manifestations of markets and the activities that take place within them.  We can begin this 
re-think with the Deleuzian conceptual toolkit outlined earlier: relations, assemblages and 
affects.  At its simplest, a market-event could be summarised as an assemblage comprising 
 
commodity ± individual A ± individual B ± money 
 
The interactions between these relations will derive entirely from the affects (capacities to 
affect and be affected) between them.  Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 453) noted the distinctive 
character of the capitalist relation that enables a commodity to be traded by A in return for a 
mutually-DJUHHGVXPRIPRQH\IURP%DFFRUGLQJWRµPDUNHWSULQFLSOHV¶:KDWLV
remarkable, they argued, is not the presence of over-arching structures or underlying 
mechanisms that assure this exchange, but rather the exceptionally de-FRQWH[WXDOLVHGRUµGH-
WHUULWRULDOLVHG¶FDSDFLW\RIWKLVUHODWLRQWRRFFXUXQFRQVWUDLQHGE\FRQWH[WXDOIDFWRUVVXFKDV
the relative statuses of A and B, which would preclude open transactions in feudal social 
forms.3   
 
Markets, DeLanda (2005: 17) argues, should be seen first and foremost as material places that 
are assemblages of humans and the things, services or abstractions they trade.  The 
GHYHORSPHQWRIDµPDUNHWHFRQRP\¶KHJRHVRQHPHUJHVfrom the geographical interactions 
of these discrete market-places, which across time and space facilitate national and 
international trading (ibid: 18).  To this we might add the material affects that derive from 
repeated, routinised and habituated pattern of interactions, memories, experiences and 
outcomes that encourage marketised behaviours.  It is out of these multiple disparate and 
often divergent events that what appears to be a stable market structure or system (and indeed 
µFDSLWDOLVP¶LWVHOIHPHUJes.   
 
However, such market behaviours and orientations possess far less stability within a non-
binary conceptualisation than in traditional sociological theories.  From such a perspective, it 
is solely the various affects within individual events that proPRWHRUFRQVWUDLQDµPDUNHW
UHODWLRQ¶DQGWKHODWWHULVFRQWLQXDOO\FKDOOHQJHGE\QHZUHODWLRQVDQGDIIHFWVWKDWPD\GH-
stabilise commercial interactions, impose constraints on markets and introduce different 
models of social interaction such as collectivism or state intervention.  This instability and 
flux, we would argue, reflects far better what actually goes on in economic and social 
transactions than claims of market hegemony (see for example, Berry, 2014). 
 
Consequently, something (the market) that has been used on occasions as a structural 
µH[SODQDWLRQ¶LQVRFLRORJLFDOVWXGLHV± for instance to claim the hegemony of contemporary 
VRFLHW\¶VQHROLEHUDORULHQWDWLRQJessop, 2002: 455) ± may be re-thought in terms of a series 
of material and relational events or assemblages, in which intra-actions are continuously 
SURGXFHGDQGUHSURGXFHGµ0DFUR¶UHODWLRQVVXFKDVJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\RUWKHFXOWXUDODQG
VRFLDOSURFHVVHVGHVFULEHGLQ%RXUGLHX¶VHVVD\RQWKHPDUNHWFDQEHLQFRUSRUDWHG
indirectly into tKHµPDUNHW-DVVHPEODJH¶LQWHUPVRIWKHDIIHFWLYLW\RIWKRVHSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHV
as they influence human and non-human relations.  A similar approach that focuses on events 
may be used to re-WKLQNRWKHUµH[SODQDWLRQV¶VXFKDVSDWULDUFK\RUFRQVXPHULVPPDNLQg 
these the things that themselves need to be explained, rather than positing them as structural, 
systemic or mechanical explanations.  What has appeared structural or systemic to 
sociologists is rather a product of reproduced affect economies or intra-actions between 
assembled relations.  This conclusion establishes the materialist framework from which to 
explore movements of power and resistance within assemblages. 
 
The relationality of power/resistance 
Power and resistance are concepts that have been foundational both to theorising social 
change and to practical interventions to address injustices or inequalities through practice, 
policy or activism (Fox and Alldred, 2017; Boudon, 1991; Dale and Kalob, 2006).  Though 
power has been variously conceptualised in social theory, sociologists have been wary of 
ontologies that reduce power to human decision-PDNLQJUHJDUGLQJVXFKPRGHOVDVµRQH-
GLPHQVLRQDO¶/XNHVRUIDLOLQJWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHGXDOLW\RIDJHQF\VWUXFWXUH
(Giddens, 1981: 49-50).  DuDOLVWDSSURDFKHVWRSRZHULQFOXGH0DU[¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKH
consequences of the social and economic relations of capitalist production (Gramsci 1971: 
181±2; Nigam, 1996: 8-&RQQHOO¶VDQDO\VLVRIJHQGHUDQGVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHDQG
3DUVRQV¶assessment of power as a circulating medium that enables a complex 
society to work effectively and manage resistance. 
 
The de-SULYLOHJLQJRIKXPDQDJHQF\DQGLWVUHMHFWLRQRIµDQRWKHUOHYHO¶RIVWUXFWXUHVRU
mechanisms together problematise notions of power theorised as top-down structural forces, 
as an aspect of structuration (Giddens, 1981: 49), RUDVDQDPRUSKRXVµVWXII¶WKDWSHUPHDWHV
the everyday social world and social interactions.  We can enunciate the precise challenges 
that a flat ontology poses for theories of power.  First, within such an ontology, phenomena 
GHVFULEHGE\VRFLRORJLVWVDVµSRZHU¶may comprise nothing more nor less than the 
interactions between assembled relations as they affect and are affected (Braidotti, 2013: 188-
189; Patton, 2000: 52).  Power is consequently integral to what goes on in this daily round of 
events; to be treated not as a unitary force upon citizens, but revealed and deployed at the 
very local level of actions and events (Barad, 2001: 94).4  Thus, for example, the gendered 
expressions of power and oppression between young people in school settings are not 
SURGXFWVRIDEVWUDFWHGVWUXFWXUDOIRUFHVVXFKDVµSDWULDUFK\¶RUµKHJHPRQLFPDVFXOLQLW\¶
Instead, they are the outcomes of micropolitical material forces and intensities operating 
within the daily round of events in and out of the classroom (Alldred and Fox, 2015).   
 
Second, within a monist sociology, power is necessarily transient and fluctuating ± a 
momentary exercise by one relation over another.  The apparent regularities or continuities in 
power discerned by sociologists (for instance, patriarchal power of one gender over another, 
or the dominance of market models of social interaction in contemporary society) will depend 
upon continued replication of these particular micropolitics between assembled relations, 
thereby sustaining particular assemblage micropolitics.  These micropolitical patternings in 
time and space may lead to continuities of hierarchic relations, to produce the semblance of 
overarching strucWXUHVRUV\VWHPVRUXQGHUO\LQJPHFKDQLVPVIRULQVWDQFHDVµSDWULDUFK\¶RU
µcapitalism).  However, this regularity is illusory: power can have continuity only so long as 
it is replicated in the next event, and the one after that, and may quickly evaporate when 
affects in an assemblage alter.   
 
From this analysis, it follows that a materialist understanding of power (and of resistance to 
power) will be radically empirical, to be both understood and researched locally and 
micropolitically, focusing upon the affects between both human and non-human relational 
materialities within events, actions and inter-actions (assemblages).  What then of resistance?  
Sociologists have always recognised an intimate association between power and resistance ± 
where there is one, there is also the other, almost by definition (Lupton, 1997: 102).  Often 
this opposition of power and resistance has been underpinned by structure/agency dualism 
(DeLanda, 2006: 10), with resistance conceptualised as the response of a plucky human 
agent, unwilling to be ground down by the coercive powers of social structures, a 
bureaucratic iron cage (Weber, 1930: 181), or the daily grind of employed work (Marx and 
Engels, 1952: 52).  
 
Once again, a materialist and relational ontology developed earlier requires that resistance is 
conceived in terms an assemblage micropolitics founded upon relations of exteriority.  This 
shifts the basis for resisting powerful forces away from an essentialised human agent with 
fixed attributes, and toward the relational capacities of assembled bodies, things and social 
IRUPDWLRQVZLWKLQDVVHPEODJHV:KDWKDVFRQYHQWLRQDOO\EHHQWHUPHGµUHVLVWDQFH¶is a flux 
of forces or affects in an assemblage that produces micropolitical effects contrary to power or 
control (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 216), whether as organised or more haphazard and 
random resistance ± moments as well as movements.   
 
Elsewhere (Fox and Alldred, 2014) we have described two micropolitical movements within 
assemblages that produce the capacities of bodies and other relations.  The first of these we 
WHUPHGVSHFLILFDWLRQJHQHUDOLVDWLRQEDVHGRQ'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL¶V-89) 
movements of territorialisation/de-territorialisation), which describe KRZDERG\¶VRURWKHU
UHODWLRQ¶VFDSDFLWLHVDUHHLWKHUIRFXVHGRUWXUQHGORRVHE\WKHDIIHFWVLQDQDVVHPEODJH7KH
GHYHORSPHQWRIVRFLDOLGHQWLWLHVDVµPDOH¶µGLVDEOHG¶µKHWHURVH[XDO¶DQGVRIRUWK is a good 
example of a specification: identities that may subsequently be generalised by other social or 
cultural affects.  The second micropolitical movement we have called aggregation/dis-
aggregation (a re-FDVWLQJRI'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL¶V-288) distinction between 
µPRODU¶DQGµPROHFXODU¶IRUFHV7KLVGLIIHUHQWLDWHVEHWZHHQIRUFHVDIIHFWVWKDWFODVVLI\RU
group relations together, and those that single them out as unique.  So, for instance, 
classifying (aggregating) bodies into social classes, races or genders has the effect of lumping 
together quite disparate persons (Colebrook, 2013: 36), whereas mentoring or sponsoring 
PD\EULQJRXWDSHUVRQ¶VXQLTXHFDSDFLWLHV 
 
,WZRXOGEHVLPSOLVWLFKRZHYHUWROLQNµSRZHU¶ZLWKVSHFLILFDWLRQDQGDJJUHgation, and 
µUHVLVWDQFH¶ZLWKPRYHPHQWVRIJHQHUDOLVDWLRQDQGGLV-aggregation (cf. Patton, 2000: 65-66).  
Though the former are frequently the means whereby relations in assemblages assert control 
and thus power over other relations, we cannot assume that resistance is always associated 
with generalisation and singularity.  As noted earlier, a capitalist market-place is actually a 
radically unconstrained space, in which anyone can trade with anyone (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1984: 222).  Resisting the forces of the free market in such circumstances may actually entail 
individual consumers aggregating together and re-VSHFLI\LQJWKHPVHOYHVDVDµZRUNHUV¶
FROOHFWLYH¶WKDWUHIXVHVWRDFFHSWWKHDQDUFK\RIWKHPDUNHWSODFH 
 
It may therefore be more accurate to see power and resistance as dual fluxes that permeate all 
assemblages, a shifting balance that is never finally settled.  Defining a certain affect as an 
assertion of power or an effort at resistance is less important than assessing the capacities that 
these affects produce.  Rather than presenting certain events as examples of coercive or 
disciplinary power, and others as instances of resistance, what may be important is to 
document how transient assemblages are stabilised, what material forces enable certain 
relations to consistently territorialise others, and how bodies are forced to resist in more and 
more obscure and desperate ways.  Furthermore, the fluctuating character of assemblage 
PLFURSROLWLFVPHDQVWKDWµSRZHU¶DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶ZD[DQGZDQHVKLIWDQGUHYHUVH
FRQWLQXDOO\DOOHYHQWVDUHFRQVHTXHQWO\VLWHVLQZKLFKERWKµSRZHU¶DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶PD\EH
discerned.  This analysis also unsettles a simplistic equation of power with action and 
resistance with reaction.   
 Discussion 
A growing number of social scientists (for a review, see Fox and Alldred, 2014) are 
embracing opportunities offered by contemporary materialist and posthuman ontologies to 
establish approaches to social theory and research not trammelled by humanism and 
essentialism, or that cut across dualisms between human and non-human, nature and culture, 
micro and macro, mind and matter (DeLanda, 2006: 26, 46; van der Tuin and Dolphijn, 210: 
156).  In this paper we have disclosed and sought to work through some of the implications of 
monist ontology for key sociological concepts such as agency, structure, power and 
resistance.  We have suggested that abolishing some cherished binaries does not make the 
sociological sky fall in.  While concepts like social structure, the critical realist pursuit of 
underlying mechanisms (Danermark et al, 2002: 59), and overarching notions such as 
µQHROLEHUDOLVP¶DQGµSDWULDUFK\¶DOOKDYHWREHDEDQGRQHG, and power and resistance have to 
be reconceptualised as operating locally and in ways that are far more fragmentary, monist 
ontology still enables the pursuit of a sociological project, both theoretically and empirically. 
 
What then might be the upside of this monism (that is also a pluralism) for a sociological 
imagination?  We would argue that there are three main opportunities.  First, dissolving 
sociological dualisms clears the ground for post-anthropocentric (Braidotti, 2011: 327) 
sociology, shifting humans from the central focus of sociological attention, and facilitating a 
posthuman sociology to engage productively with the world beyond the human: with other 
living things, and with the wider environment of matter and things.  By challenging any 
distinction between the materiality of the physical world and the social constructs of human 
thoughts and desires, it enables exploration of how each affects the other, and how things 
other than humans (for instance, a tool, a technology or a building) can be sociaOµDJHQWV¶
making things happen.  This flattening of the nature/culture dualism is applicable not only 
when exploring topics such as environmental change, technology or science, but also to re-
think the part that the non-human and non-animate, matter and meaning play in social 
production more generally (Karakayali, 2015), for instance in education (Alldred and Fox, 
2017) or public health (Fox and Alldred, 2016). 
 
Second, a sociological imagination in which there are no structures, no systems and no 
PHFKDQLVPVDWZRUNPHDQVIRFXVLQJPXFKPRUHLQWHQWO\XSRQµHYHQWV¶WKHHQGOHVVFDVFDGH
of events comprising the material effects of both nature and culture that together produce the 
world and human history (Sotiris, 2016: 303).  Indeed, this move dramatically simplifies the 
project of sociological explanation.  In place of a search for elusive structures or mechanisms, 
the agenda for social inquiry re-focuses upon the micropolitics of the world of events (Latour, 
2005: 65-66); power or resistance are explained in terms of assemblage micropolitics and the 
capacities produced in bodies, things and social formations.  Post-structuralism questioned 
WKHLGHDRIDFRHUFLYHµWRS-GRZQ¶SRZHUDUJXLQJLQVWHDGWKDW power in the contemporary 
world is disciplinary or governmental, productive of subjectivities and dispositions (Foucault, 
1979; Rose, 1999).  The perspective applied in this paper goes further, to establish a 
micropolitics of power and resistance amenable to empirical exploration in terms of the 
affective fluxes within events.  The terms µpRZHU¶DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶ may offer the impression 
of much more concerted social processes, whereas at the level of an event the flux of forces 
in assemblages may often shift the capacities of bodies or collections of bodies from moment 
to moment.   
 
Third, feminists, post-colonial scholars, queer theorists and other socially and politically 
engaged scholars have suggested that the radical monism of materialism and posthumanism 
ensure that social theory is embedded and embodied in the materiality of life and struggle 
(Braidotti, 2011: 128; Grosz, 1994: 164) and is thence a means both to research the social 
world and change it for the better.  Though post-structuralism challenged top-down, 
determinist theories of power and social structure, a focus upon textuality, discourses and 
systems of thought in these approaches tended to create distance between theory and practice, 
and gave the sense that radical, interventionist critiques of inequities and oppressions were 
little more than further constructions of the social world (Coole and Frost, 2010: 25; 
Edwards, 2010: 282).  At the same time, as we saw in our analysis of power and resistance 
earlier, monist sociology offers a radical critique of essentialism, placing in question 
ontologies that posit entities with pre-existing attributes (such as abilities, genders) or a fixed 
stable reality in which power is asserted by one party and resistance mounted by another.  
Replacing sociological dualisms with multiplicities acknowledges the emergent character of 
the world and all the possibilities this implies (Barad, 2001: 77; Braidotti, 2013: 60).   
 
Our intention in this paper has been to examine the impact of a flattened ontology of the 
social world for sociology, rather than specifically to advocate materialist or posthuman 
perspectives.  We retain reservations about both of WKHµPDQLIHVWRV¶IRUQRQ-binary sociology 
that we considered earlier.  For us, DeLanda places too much emphasis upon the stability and 
continuities of social assemblages, whether person-to-person interaction or city or nation 
assemblages.  This, we would argue, is due largely to his rigid stratification of assemblages 
into a hierarchy of levels, which emphasises social institutions rather than events, and does 
not fully acknowledge the interactions between micro and macro that bring both fluidity and 
stability to assemblages.  We find in actor-QHWZRUNWKHRU\HYHQLQ/DWRXU¶VODWHVW
formulations, a residual essentialism associated with the entities (whether a body or a 
physical object such as a laboratory or a technology) LGHQWLILHGLQ$17¶VHPSLULFDOVWXGLHV
that does not fully acknowledge the exteriority of their relations and capacities (cf. Cudworth 
and Hobden, 2005: 138).  To inform the sociological imagination, a monistic sociology might 
usefully draw not only upon these scholars, but also RQ%UDLGRWWL¶VDQDO\VLVRI
anthropocentrism and posthumanism, %HQQHWW¶V(2010) vitalist ecology, and the Spinozist 
theorising of affect in Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 260) and others.   
 
Notes 
1.  The µnHZ¶PDWHULDOLVPs encompass disparate perspectives, including actor-network 
theory, artificial intelligence, biophilosophy, evolutionary theory, feminism, neuroscience, 
non-representational theory, posthumanism, queer theory, quantum physics and Spinozist 
monism.  For more on these, see Ansell Pearson (1999); Fox and Alldred (2014, 2017); Coole 
and Frost (2010); Thrift (2004).   
2.  Paradoxically, the monism of the new materialisms is not a move to universalism or a 
unitary perspective upon the social or upon subjectivity; rather, a rejection of dualisms opens 
up a multiplicity and diversity that exceeds and overwhelms the dichotomies they replace 
(Braidotti, 2011: 211; van der Tuin and Dolphijn, 2010: 158).  One equals many in this 
ontology ± DV'HOHX]HKDVLWµWKHRQO\HQHP\LVWZR¶0XOWLSOLFLW\LV
acknowledged variously throughout new materialist thought: in DeleuzoGuattarian notions of 
rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 30), nomadology (ibid: 380-381), and becoming (ibid: 
LQ%DUDG¶VGLIIUDFWLYHPHWKRGRORJ\LQ0RO¶VERG\-multiple; and in 
%UDLGRWWL¶VQRPDGLFVXEMHFW 
3.  In practice, this µpure¶ capitalist transaction is trammelled by further affects that inhibit its 
completion, such as sales taxes or tariffs, regulations on safety of goods or consumer 
protection, international trade rules, geographical barriers, or cultural values such as those 
that have until recently kept whole areas of social life such as education, health care and 
religion off-limits from markets. 
4.  This Nietzschean understanding of the immanence of power is common to the work of 
both Deleuze and Foucault (Patton, 2000: 49-52, 55). 
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